"I know it when I see it" - censorship, a search for certainty : a note on Society for the Promotion of Community Standards v. Waverley International (1988) Ltd. by Whimp, Matthew Peter.
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
W572 
1993 
MATIHEW PETER WHIMP 
"I know it when I see it."* 
CENSORSHIP: A SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY 
A Note on Society for thf? Promotion of Community 
Standards v Waverley International (1988) Ltd 
Matthew Whimp 
Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree 
Victoria University of Wellington 
l September 1993 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
CONTENTS 
SECTION PAGE 
I Introduction 1 
II The Facts 2 
III The Decision of the High Court 3 
A The Majority Approach 3 
B The Minority Approach 6 
IV Which Approach to Guideline 2 is to be Pref erred 9 
A A Theoretical Approach to the Phrase "Injurious to the Public Good" 9 
B The Judicial Approach to the Phrase "Injurious to the Public Good" 11 
C Resolution of these Two Approaches 12 
V Policy Implications of This Approach 13 
VI The Interpretation of "Demeaning to Women" 16 
A Judicial Approach to Demeaning to Women 16 
B The Feminist Approach to Pornography 18 
C The Resolution of these Two Approaches in Guideline 2 20 
VII An Alternative? 22 
VIII The Films, Videos and Publications Classification Bill 1992; Does it 24 
Improve the Situation 
A The Greater Need for Certainty 25 
B The Definition under Cl 3 25 
IX Conclusion 29 
* Stewart Jin Jacobellis v Ohio (1964) 378 US 184, 197. 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Censorship, throughout history has been an area of law which provokes a large 
amount of controversy in societies which value democracy. A fundamental tenet of a 
democracy is the freedom of citizens to express their views, thus creating a society 
capable of reaping the benefits of the ideas of all. From this basic premise, the need to 
limit to some extent the absolute right to freedom of speech has arisen, based on the 
theory that not all expression is beneficial to society, and that which is detrimental must 
be suppressed to benefit society as a whole. To this end, the legislature and courts have 
created criminal sanctions of serious consequence to proscribe what it sees as 
detrimental expression. Because of the importance of free speech, the law-makers have 
been at pains to ensure that what is suppressed is that, and only that, which it sees as 
detrimental to society. This has been achieved with a varying amount of success 1• One 
fundamental part of the suppression of that which the legislature sees as detrimental, is 
creating a definition which includes only that which it wishes to proscribe and no more. 
This paper will analyse Society for the Promotion of Community Standards v Waverly 
International (1988) Ltd2, a case in which issues of definitional certainty expose some 
weaknesses in the present censorship legislation under the Indecent Publications Act 
1963, especially in light of the current attack on pornography by feminist thinkers. 
This paper will examine the issues that this case raises, in tem1s of the interpretation of 
guidelines issued by the Indecent Publications Tribunal, in light of the wider needs for 
definitional certainty in censorship law. It will then attempt an analysis of the new 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Bill 1993, as to its success in addressing 
the problems under the existing law. 
The success of the government is a purely subjective assessment, depending upon one's 
philosophical approach to censorship law. As was pointed out in The Report of the Ministerial 
Committee of Inquiry into Pornography (Justice Dept , Wellington, 1989), pp 13-26, the wide scope of 
views in New Zealand on pornography and censorship mean that the legislature will be unable to satisfy 
the wishes of all. 
2 Unreported, 27 Nov 1992, High Court Wellington Registry AP 213/91. 
LAW LIBRAP.Y 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF ~:ELLl!JGl ,JN 
2 
II THE FACTS OF Society for the Protection of Community Standards 
v Waverly International (1988) Ltd. 
---
Waverly came before the High Court on appeal from a decision of the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal, pursuant to s 19 of the Indecent Publications Act 1963. The 
case concerned a number of magazines which had been seized by the Collector of 
Customs, who had referred the magazines to the Tribunal for classification 3• The 
magazines were grouped into nine categories by the customs department based on the 
similar nature of their content. The appeal was primarily focused on the magazines in 
category e, 6 of which were classified as unconditionally indecent, the remaining 109 
magazines being classified as indecent in the hands of persons under the age of 18. 
The Tribunal stated that their reason for this classification was that six of the magazines 
came under the second of the guidelines issued by it in Re "Penthouse (US)" Vo/ 19, 
No 5 and others5 • It stated that the dominant effect should not be established simply by 
a count of depictions, there should be a qualitative analysis also 6• The effect must 
"prevail" over the other material. The injury to the public good cited by the Tribunal, to 
which guideline 2 is aimed, is the reinforcement of negative male attitudes towards 
women7• One should examine the depictions, their manner and extent and ask if the 
dominant effect of the magazines is to demean or treat as inherently inferior any person 
or group of persons 8• It was then stated that the dominant effect of six of the 
magazines in category C was to demean women and thus they were to be classified as 
unconditionally indecent and that the remainder came under guideline 39 and should be 
3 Re "Candy Floss No 1" Decision No. 28/91 . 
4 There were 115 magazines in this category and were described by the Tribunal as containing 
"photographs of single female models with very little accompanying text. Generally these publications 
place more emphasis, to a greater or lesser degree depending on each publication, on female 
genitalia, than those in category B", Above n 3, 5. 
s [1991 J NZAR 289; See below Part Ill A for the full text and history of guideline 2. 
6 Above n 3, 7. 
7 Above n 3, 7; See also below Part VI C. 
0 Above n 3, 7. 
9 Guideline 3 states: Depictions of individuals or sexual activity which do not fall into the above 
categories are conditionally indecent or not indecent depending on our application of the factors in s 
11 [of the Indecent Publications Act 1963] (in this regard we emphasise matters of availability or 
distribution) and the definition of indecency in s 2. 
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classified R 18. The Society was joined as a party in the Tribunal hearing below, thus 
giving it standing to appeal that decision to the high court 10 • The Society based their 
appeal on three grounds. First, that the Tribunal applied an incorrect test of indecency, 
secondly that the Tribunal erred by relying upon the guidelines prescribed by the 
Tribunal in Re Penthouse (1990), thirdly that the Tribunal erred, by reserving itself the 
right to review the classification of a number of magazines, if an undertaking restricting 
distribution was broken. This paper will not deal with the third of these three grounds. 
III THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT 
A The Majority Approach 
The majority decision of Tipping and Jaine JJ was delivered by Tipping J The 
first issue addressed by the Court was as to the nature of the appeal. It was stressed by 
Tipping J, that the Court was not able to exercise the jurisdiction of the tribunal de 
novo, and was restricted to an examination as to whether the Tribunal came to their 
decision by an error of law. The first ground of appeal, that the Tribunal applied an 
erroneous test for indecency, was given little attention by the judge, as counsel for the 
appellant could not point to any specific error and relied on the "general flavour of the 
tlibunal's decision" 11 • Tipping J stated that the Tribunal was clearly referring to the 
definition of indecent in s 2 and the criteria of s 11 of the Indecent Publications Act 
1963 when they made their classification 12• 
The second ground of appeal, that the Tribunal erred by relying on guideline 2, 
was the main focus of the judgment. The use of guidelines was originally introduced 
into the decision making "vocabulary" of the Tribunal in the Waverly decisions of 
1968 13 . Guidelines were developed by the tribunal to assist those persons and 
16 Section 19(1) of the Indecent Publications Act 1963. 
11 Above n 2, 15. 
12 Above n 2, 16. 
13 New Zealand Gazette, 25 July 1968, p 1251. 
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organisations that deal with material that may potentially be the subject of censorship, to 
determine in advance the likely nature of that censorship. New guidelines were 
formulated in Re Penthouse (1990), which included guideline 214 : 
Depictions of sexual activity which demean or treat as inherently inferior or unequal any 
person or group of persons, which are not serious treatments and which are intended as 
sexual stimuli, are indecent (by way of example, this would include magazines the 
dominant content of which is the depiction of single models spreading their labia, 
magazines the dominant content of which is the close-up depiction of genitalia or other 
body parts, and other depictions which reduce a person to her or bis sexual parts) . 
Tipping J saw no problem with the Tribunal from time to time issuing and updating 
guidelines. The Society's first head of argument under this ground was that the 
Tribunal had elevated the guideline above the statutory criteria. It is clear law that 
guidelines issued to assist in the application of statutory criteria should not be elevated 
above those statutory criteria so that the guidelines become the test in place of the 
statutory criteria. In the case Comptroller of Customs v Gordon & Gotch 15, Quilliam J 
stated16 : 
For myself I see no objection to the establishment by the Tribunal of criteria which are 
designed to assist it to a conclusion as to whether a document is injurious to the public 
good. I do not accept that there can properly be any slavish adherence to a fomrnla in 
such matters. The danger of using a formula is that it tends to become in itself the test 
without reference to the principle which alone can be the proper basis of the decision. 
Tipping J regarded that the Society's first argument to be unfounded and stated that the 
"Tribunal was careful to record in several places in the decision under appeal that it was 
treating the guidelines as guidelines only and was ultimately addressing itself to the 
statutory criteria" 11• 
The alternative argument for the Society, was that the tribunal had applied the 
guideline incorrectly. In order to address this argument, Tipping J examined the 
Above n 5, 325. 
15 [1987] 2 NZLR 80. 
16 Above n 15, 83. 
17 Above n 2, 25. 
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meaning and application of guideline 2. Tipping J was of the view that guideline 2 
could be better expressed, but the principle of the guideline was clear18• The guideline 
was to be applied with a two step approach. The first step is to ascertain whether the 
dominant content of the magazine is the type of depiction which is given by way of 
example, in parentheses, in the guideline19• The second step is to find that the 
dominant effect of the publication as a whole is to demean or treat as inherently inferior 
any person or group of persons. Tipping J recognised that: 20 
The guideline is clearly not intended to produce the result that the magazines, the 
dominant content of which is for example, the depiction of single models spreading their 
labia, are to be regarded as per se indecent. 
The publication must, in addition to the dominant content, have the dominant effect of 
demeaning or treating as inherently inferior any person or group of persons 21 • This 
conclusion is reflected in the suggested redraft of the guideline proposed by Tipping J22: 
A Publication whose dominant content is the depiction of multiple or single models 
spreading their labia, the close-up depiction of genitalia or other body parts or other 
depictions which reduce a person to bis or her body parts, which are intended as sexual 
stimuli and which are not serious treatments are indecent if the dominant effect of such 
publication as a whole, is to demean or treat as inherently inferior any person or group of 
persons. 
This formulation was preferred by Tipping J as it made the focus of the guideline 
clearer23 : 
There will obviously be cases, of which the present guideline 2 is an example, where it is 
necessary, to avoid giving the wrong impression, to include within tl1e guideline a 
qualifying or limiting element based on the effect of the material in question . 
Tipping J then examined whether the tribunal had applied the guideline correctly. He 
Above n 2, 24. 
19 Above n 2, 21. 
20 Above n 2, 22. 
21 Above n 2, 22. 
22 Above n 2, 24; It should be noted that in subsequent decisions of the Tribunal, that the 
formulation proposed by Tipping J has not been adopted; See Indecent Publications Tribunal 
Decision No 45/93, 2. 
23 Above n 2, 21. 
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stated that they had found that the material in category C publications fell within the 
examples given in brackets by guideline 2 24 • But in the case of a majority of the 
magazines, their dominant effect was not to demean any person or group of persons 25• 
Thus by addressing both limbs, the Tribunal had not erred in applying the guideline. 
Tipping J recognised that the Society was really trying to argue that the Tribunal had 
been plainly wrong on the facts. The test to be applied is that the assessment of the 
Tribunal "was plainly wrong as one no reasonable tribunal could have made" 26• 
Tipping J recognised the experience and expertise of the Tribunal and that the difference 
between those magazines classified as unconditionally indecent and those classified 
R18 was one of degree 21 and as such, the court was not able to say that the facts 
inescapably lead to a conclusion that the tribunal was plainly wrong. 28 Thus the appeal 
was dismissed. 
B The Minority Approach 
The minority judgement was delivered by Eichelbaum CJ. He was in agreement with 
the majority on all but one of the issues, this being the actual final classification the 
tribunal gave the magazines. It is difficult to see from the judgment of Eichelbaum CJ, 
which of the grounds of appeal he disagreed with the majority on, in order to come to 
his conclusion that the magazines were incorrectly classified by the Tribunal. 
Eichelbaum CJ does not clearly state the actual ground upon which he relies, but it is 
implicit that he is relying on the ground that the decision of the Tribunal was plainly 
wrong, as one that no reasonable tribunal could make 29• It is submitted that Eichelbaum 
CJ differed in his analysis from that of the majority in two respects in coming to his 
Above n 2, 26. 
25 Above n 2, 29. 
26 Above n 2, 31. 
21 In coming to this conclusion, Tipping J emphasised that this was not an appeal by way of 
rehearing, and as such, the Court had not had the benefit of hearing evidence on the nature of the 
magazines; Above n 2, 29. 
28 Above n 2, 30 . 
29 Society for the Promotion of Community Standards v Waverly International (1988) Ltd and 
Another Unreported, 27 Nov 1992, High Court Wellington Registry AP 213/91; Dissenting Judgment 
of Eichelbaum CJ; 7. 
• • 
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conclusion that the 109 magazines classified by the Tribunal as R 18, should have been 
classified as unconditionally indecent. The first is that the Chief Justice substituted his 
own view of the facts for that of the Tribunal. Appeals to the High Court from 
decisions of the Tribunal are governed bys 19(2) of the Indecent Publications Act: 
The High Court shall hear and determine the appeal as if the decision of the Tribunal had 
been made in the exercise of a discretion . 
Such an appeal is not one by way of rehearing, thus the threshold for holding that the 
Tribunal was plainly wrong when addressing itself to the correct legal test should be 
higher than if this were an appeal de novo30• It is submitted that Eichelbaum CJ was 
lead to the conclusion that the Tribunal was plainly wrong on the facts because of the 
manner in which Eichelbaum applied the second guideline to his view of the facts. The 
emphasis in Eichelbaum CJ's analysis was on the depictions of the models, rather than 
whether the dominant effect of each magazine was to demean women or to treat women 
as inherently inferior. Eichelbaum CJ in his analysis of what constituted the dominant 
effect of the magazine emphasised the approach of the Tribunal, that this was not to be 
assessed on a purely quantitative analysis of each magazine. A qualitative analysis was 
also necessary31• He then went on to argue, that if a publisher included in a magazine a 
significant number of "Pornographic"32 photographs in a magazine, it must be inferred 
that the intention of the publisher was that these photos were intended to have the most 
in1pact. Thus, this would be deemed to be the dominant effect, notwithstanding that the 
publisher in fact failed in his/her intention33 • This argument must be incorrect. The test 
of indecency from Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd34 is whether a 
publication actually injures the public good. To say that in fact a publication does not 
injure the public good, but will be declared indecent because it was intended that the 
publication injure the public good is inconsistent with the test of actual injury and is 
inconsistent with Eichelbaum CJ's next statement that "the decision must be made on a 
30 This paper will not examine the threshold which will allow a judge on appeal from a lower court 
which is not by way of rehearing, to overrule the lower tribunal's conclusion on the facts. 
31 Above n 29, 6. 
32 Above n 29, 6. 
33 Above n 29, 6. 
34 (1986] 1 NZLR 404, 408 . 
DI 
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consideration of each magazine" 35 • This analysis involves a jump from the dominant 
content of a magazine to the dominant effect of the magazine, by way of the intention of 
the publisher. Thus effect is deemed from, and equated with the image on the page. 
This approach flavours the next passage in which again Eichelbaum CJ examined the 
content of the magazines, rather than whether the dominant effect of the publication 
was that women in general were demeaned by those depictionS36 : 
The photographs of those R 18 magazines I looked at are an unrelenting concentration on 
the female models' genital and posterior areas, with numerous close up shots of genitalia 
often spread by the model' s fingers. Many show as well other portions of the model's 
body including her face but this to my mind does not detract from the dominant effect. A 
number of poses are contrived or contorted; the women are depicted as available for male 
sexual gratification. 
It is submitted that the emphasis in this passage is on the nature of the depictions and 
that the conclusion reached that37 : 
... the dominant effect of such a publication taken as a whole is Lo demean women and 
treat them as inherently inferior. 
is a direct result of the inclusion in the depiction of material which is referred to in the 
brackets of guideline 2 by way of example. There is no analysis of how the depictions 
actually treat any person or group of persons as inherently inferior. There is no 
analysis of the actual effect on the reader . The words "the women a.re depicted as 
available for male sexual gratification" are an analysis of the image on the page and 
seems to be a conclusion derived from the inclusion of the various elements included in 
the brackets of guideline 2 alluded to in the words previous to that passage. There is no 
reasoning for this statement apart from the reference to the depictions of elements 
referred to in the brackets of guideline 2. Thus in Eichelbaum CJ's analysis, the 
inclusion of such material will, if found to be the dominant content of the magazine, 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the dominant effect of the magazine is to demean 
or treat as inherently inferior. No analysis of the actual effect of the magazine is needed 
Above n 29, 7. 
36 Above n 29, 7. 
37 Above n 29, 7 . 
• • 
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if those elements are indeed found to be the dominant content. Thus a conclusion of 
"demeaning" will be reached if the elements included in brackets exist as the dominant 
content, regardless of the effect on the reader. 
IV WHICH APPROACH TO GUIDELINE 2 IS TO BE PREFERRED 
The question of which approach is to be preferred may be answered by an 
analysis of the jurisprudential basis for limiting the freedom of speech under the 
Indecent Publications Act. The definition for indecency is given under s 2 of the Act 
as: 
"Indecent" includes describing, depicting, expressing, or otherwise dealing with matters of 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in a manner that is injurious to the public good. 
In Lawrence, the court of appeal decided that the meaning of indecent was coloured by 
the qualifying phrase "injurious to the public good". Thus the ordinary meaning of 
indecent could not be relied on by the Tribunal to hold that something is objectionable 
and thus subject to censorship, it needed to be "injurious to the public good"38 • The 
phrase "injurious to the public good" is open to different interpretations39 • 
A A Theoretical Approach to the Phrase "Injurious to the Public Good" 
There are two possible jurisprudential bases for censorship which could be put 
forward as being intended by the legislature under the phrase "injurious to the public 
good. The first is the morality principal40 which is: 
the notion that law is properly concerned with the preservation of a particular structure of 
moral beliefs, coupled with the related axiom that reference to moral precepts can by itself 
justify censorship of heretical expression . 
If the interpretation of indecency is based on this principle, then once the structure of 
Above n 34, 408 . 
39 See below Part IV B. 
40 S Gey "The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea" 
(1988) 86 Michigan L Rev 1564, 1568. 
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moral beliefs is established4 ', any material inconsistent with those moral beliefs can be 
justifiably censored. The second is the harm principle42: 
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the 
one prohibited from acting) arv1 there is probably no other means that is equally effective 
at no greater cost to other values. 
Under this principal, in order for a publication to be injurious to the public good, the 
material must have an effect which is harmful 43 to some person, group or society as a 
whole. Under the harm principle, the effect of pornography on the reader which causes 
the harm is an essential element to be established before any limitation of freedom of 
expression can be justified. Thus any guideline which is designed to give effect to such 
a test should necessarily include that effect as part of that test. If a guideline does not 
include such an effect as an element of the test, and only refers to objectively 
identifiable criteria, then a publication which includes those criteria, but does not have 
the effect which the guideline is aimed at, will be interpreted by the lay person 
differently to that of the Tribunal, who will have reference to the effect that the 
guideline intends to prevent. The morality principle would admit guidelines of both 
types . Because any publication which causes a harm proscribed under the harm 
principle will always be inconsistent with the moral structure of a society, such 
publications will be caught under the morality principle. The morality principle will 
41 There has been criticism of this principle by both feminist and liberal writers alike; See S Gey, 
above n 40; See also C MacKinnon "Not a Moral Issue" (1984) 2 Yale Law & Policy Rev 292; The main 
criticism stems from the need in such a principle to establish what the structure of moral beliefs in a 
society is before an assessment of whether a given publication varies from it. Because any censorship 
decision is made by a tribunal (whether judge, jury or other), the moral structure used is necessarily 
subjective based on the tribunals assessment of community standards. Thus the moral structure being 
protected may only be the one perceived by the tribunal as the actual moral structure, when in fact it 
may not be. In New Zealand this problem exists to some extent also. The appointment of a specialist 
Tribunal mitigates this problem though, as it is able to hear evidence as to community standards under 
s 6(1) of the Indecent Publications Act; See extensive survey in Re Penthouse (1990) . 
42 J Feinberg The moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1984) 26. 
43 There has been criticism of this principle; See K Lahey "Pornography and Harm - Learning to 
listen to women" (1991) Vol 14 Nos 1/2 International Journal of Law and Psychology 117; This criticism 
is directed at the limited definition of harm often put forward by liberals as being harm proscribed by the 
criminal law and that there must be a direct causal link between the use of pornography and the harm 
proscribed. Thus harm of the kind objected to by feminist writers, being based on largely anecdotal 
evidence, is regarded as no harm at all under the liberal view. 
II 
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also catch publications which are simply inconsistent with the moral structure of our 
society. Thus the publication need not have a harmful effect on the reader, it may 
simply be inconsistent with the community standards of tolerance"\ A guideline under 
this principle need not have reference to an effect if it attempts to proscribe publications 
inconsistent with the moral standards of the community. 
B The Judicial Approach to "Injurious to the Public Good" 
The case law on this point is confused as to which principle the Indecent 
Publications Act works under. In Lawrence, Woodhouse P emphasised the need for 
the material to have some capacity for actual harm45 • He also emphasises that an affront 
to the commonly held community standards is not enough for the indecency standard 
contemplated by the Act46• In Society for the Protection of Community Standards v 
Everarcf7, these statements were interpreted to mean48 : 
... that which is an affront to commonly accepted standards is not, as a consequence, 
necessarily injurious to the public good. It may be. It may not be. That is not to 
suggest that no regard should be paid to "commonly accepted community standards", so 
far as such can be identified in today's turbulent society. Such may well provide at least a 
worthwhile starting point for determining whether material " is likely to be injurious to 
the public good. 
In Re Penthouse (1990), it is implicit in the Tribunal's decision that its interpretation of 
what will constitute material "injurious the public good" through the guidelines, that 
their interpretation continues to "reflect society's standards"49• 
This change in approach from the decision in Lawrence may be justified on the 
A moral generally held by the public may be that sex should be confined to marriage. Any 
depiction which shows sex outside marriage will be inconsistent with this moral precept and therefore 
be injurious to the public good. The depiction may need to have no effect on the reader to be banned. 
45 Above n 34, 409. 
46 Above n 34, 406. 
47 (1987) 7 NZAR 33. 
48 Above n 47, 56. 
49 Above n 5, 322. 
II 
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introduction of the New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990. Article 19(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which can be used to interpret the 
Act through its affirn1ation in the long title of the Act), states the freedom of expression 
conferred bys 14 of the Bill of Rights Act50 can be justifiably limited under s 5 by the 
Tribunal acting in performance of a duty prescribed by law under s 3 on two grounds51 : 
(a) For the respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order ... or of public health or 
morals . 
Thus the Tribunal must when interpreting what "injurious to the public good" means, 
under s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, interpret that phrase consistent with both the 
freedom of expression conferred by s 14 and also the justifiable limits under s 5, as 
interpreted with regard to the Covenant. This means that the Tribunal has a duty to 
look to the commonly held community standards in the interpretation of indecency as 
one of the justifiable limits on the freedom of expression is the protection of public 
morals. 
C Resolution of these Two Approaches 
Thus New Zealand censorship law under the Indecent Publications Act is firmly 
based in the morality principle. This allows the Tribunal to censor material merely 
because it is inconsistent with community standards. This necessarily includes 
censorship because of a perceived harm that such material may cause, as such harm will 
always be inconsistent with community standards. In terms of guidelines, this means it 
is permissible to issue guidelines which refer solely to depictions alone without 
reference to any effect that they are to have on the reader before they will be censored, 
because such effect is not necessary, if such depictions are inconsistent with community 
standards. An example of such a guideline is in guideline l 52: 
Section 14 provides: Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
51 These two elements are included in Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights as limitations on an absolute right to freedom of expression in Article 19(2). 
52 Above n 5, 325. 
• 
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Depictions of violence, sexual violence, paedophilia, necrophilia, copropbilia, urolagnia 
and bestiality, which are not treated seriously and are intended as sexual stimuli are 
indecent. 
If material contains depictions under this guideline, then regardless of the effect such 
material may or may not have on a person who reads it, that material will be held 
indecent. 
Guideline 2 is directed at a perceived harm 53 (ie. to demean or treat as inherently 
inferior any person is harmful to a person, group or society as a whole and this is a 
justification for limiting freedom of expression). A guideline based upon this harm, 
must necessarily include reference to the effect that material must have upon the reader 
before the material can be declared indecent. The material must have the effect of 
demeaning women in the perception of the reader, necessarily meaning that the material 
must demean women before it will be held indecent. Thus a simple reference to 
objectively certain elements of a depiction ideally must be qualified in some way by a 
reference to the effect upon the reader that the publication has which causes the harm. 
On this approach, it becomes clear that under the Indecent Publications Act, the 
approach of, Tipping J is more consistent with the jurisprudential basis for censorship, 
when that basis is a perceived harm. The simple reference to depictions which, if 
present, deem the effect are not enough, the effect must be shown as well. 
V POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS APPROACH 
Guidelines issued by the Indecent Publications Tribunal serve a dual purpose, 
the first is: 54 
.. .The Tribunal is endeavouring Lo assist those who have to administer the Act and whose 
53 The Tribunal perceives that reinforcing negative male attitudes towards women and their 
attitudes to coercive sexual behavior in material which demeans women is harmful; Above n 5, 328; 
See also C MacKinnon "Not a moral issue" (1984) 2 Yale Law & Policy Rev 321; K Lahey "Pornography 
and harm - Learning to Listen to Women" (1991) Vol 14 Nos 1/2 International Journal of Law and 
Psychology 117; See below Part VI for a fuller analysis. 
54 Above n 2, 17. 
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activities are governed by the Act so that they may know in advance in general terms 
what classification certain material is likely to receive. 
In serving this purpose, the Tribunal also emphasises that "[the guidelines'] primary 
and overriding requirement [is] to reflect the prevailing society standards and to prevent 
injury to the public good"55 • Thus a guideline should maximise the objective certainty 
required of lay people and organisations who deal with material potentially subject to 
censorship under the Indecent Publications Act, while staying within the limits of the 
test for indecency laid down in s 2 and s 11 of that Act and the jurisprudential basis for 
such legislation 56• A number of persons and organisations deal with material which 
may be subject to censorship on a day to day basis. Customs, importers of such 
material, distributors, retailers, travellers bringing material into New Zealand privately, 
authors and producers of sound recordings and the customers of retail outlets for such 
material. Such people need to know in advance of any seizure or dealing whether a 
publication57 is likely to be declared indecent by the Tribunal. Under s 21(1) of the 
Indecent Publications Act a number of offenses58 of strict liability are laid down. Under 
s 21(2) of the Act, it is stated that: 
It shall be no defence Lo a charge under [subsection (1)] that the defendant had no 
knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the document, sound recording, matter, 
or thing to which the charge relates was of an indecent nature. 
Ins 21(3) it is stated that: 
It is a defence Lo a charge under subsection (1) that the act of the defendant had no 
inunoral or mischievous tendency. 
Above n 5, 324. 
56 Above n 5, 324. 
57 Under s 2 of the Indecent Publications Act 1963 "document" is defined as: " ... any book, 
newspaper, periodical, picture, film, photograph, photographic negative, photographic plate, or 
photographic slide, and any print or writing, and any paper or other thing which has printed or 
impressed upon it or otherwise shown thereon any word, statement , sign, picture, or representation." 
58 Such offenses include: (a) Sells or hires, or is in possession for the purpose of sale and hire, 
indecent material; (b) Printing an indecent document; (ba) Publishes for the purpose of sale any 
indecent material; (c) Makes an indecent sound recording; (d) Causes to be inserted in any newspaper, 
indecent material; (e) Exhibits for payment, indecent material; (f) Exhibits to any person indecent 
material, which is indecent in the hands of someone who is the age of the person to whom the material 
is exhibited; (g) Deals with indecent material contrary to any qualification of indecency put on it; (i) 
Exhibits indecent material in or within view of a public place; G) Sends unsolicited indecent material to 
any person by way of advertising. 
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Under s 12(2), it is stated that: 
.. . where in any civil or criminal proceedings before a Court ... a question arises as to 
whether any book or sound recording is indecent within the meaning of this Act or is 
indecent in the hands of persons under a specified age or is indecent unless its circulation 
is restricted to specified persons or a class of persons or unless used for a particular 
purpose, as the case may be, the court shall refer the question to the Tribunal for decision 
and report, and the Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the question . 
Read together, these provisions mean a conviction for dealing with indecent material 
can be obtained without the material in question having been subject to a decision of the 
Tribunal prior to the offence, notwithstanding that the defendant has no knowledge or 
even suspicion that the publication is indecent. A defence may exist under s 21(3), but 
the lack of immoral or mischievous tendency could not be due solely to the lack of 
knowledge of the nature of the material, as this would allow a defence which is 
expressly prohibited under section 21(2). Thus the onus falls on the person who deals 
with material which may be subject to censorship under the Indecent Publications Act to 
make an assessment as to whether material is indecent and thus whether so to deal with 
it or not. This makes public access to an objectively certain standard of extremely high 
importance. A test which is framed in objectively certain terms, which requires of the 
lay person no subjective value judgments would be the ideal for such a guideline. 
The problem with the interpretation of guideline 2 proposed by Tipping J is that 
there is a necessary requirement that anyone attempting to use the guideline to adjudge 
whether a publication may be subject to some classification under the Indecent 
Publications Act, must make an assessment as to whether it demeans women. Under 
the guidelines as presently fran1ed this poses problems. 
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VI THE INTERPRETATION OF "DEMEANING TO WOMEN" 
A Judicial Approach To The Interpretation Of Demeaning To Women 
The first judicial examination of the concept of "demeaning women" and its 
place under the Indecent Publications Act was in the case Comptroller of Customs v 
Gordon & Gotch. This was an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal 59 in which two 
of the Tribunal members held a publication unconditionally indecent on the basis that it 
denigrated60 women. One of the issues on appeal was whether the Tribunal could under 
the statutory test of indecency hold that a publication which denigrated women was 
injurious to the public good. Quilliam J in response to this question was of the view 
that61 : 
The expressions "representational view of women" and "denigration of all women" are 
imprecise and not, in my view, capable of definition so as to fonn a logical and coherent 
basis for a decision as to the classification of a document. 
This view was expanded upon by Jeffries J. He thought that to say that the intention of 
the publishers of such magazines by the representations used in such magazines was to 
denigrate all women was illogical and that such an interpretation moved away from "the 
actual and real towards symbolism and questionable labelling" 62• The judge drew an 
analogy between prostitution and the representations of women in the magazines, 
saying that it could not be said that prostitution denigrated all women as a class, as no 
one would associate all women with prostitutes. Thus no one would identify women 
as a class with the models in a magazine and thus be denigrated63 • Thus under this 
view, the Tribunal could not use the argument that a publication depicting conduct 
which had the effect of demeaning the models, these models represented all women and 
as such this had a wider effect of demeaning all women. A model in a "pornographic" 
59 Re 'Fiesta 11 and "Knave11 (1986) 6 NZAR 213. 
60 It should be noted that the word "denigrated" is included as part of the matters to be taken into 
account for the classification of videos under s 21 (2)(e) of the Video Recordings Act 1987. 
61 Above n 15, 83. 
62 Above n 15, 93. 
63 Above n 15, 94. 
I 
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magazine could not be a symbol for all women64. 
The Tribunal up until 1990 was not prepared to use the argument that a 
publication could be held indecent if its dominant effect was to demean women65• In 
Re Penthouse (1990), by issuing Guideline 2, the Tribunal stated that this was an 
attempt to include a feminist viewpoint. Jeffries Jin Gordon & Gotch expressed some 
concern about the use of a feminist argument in Tribunal proceedings66, but this 
objection was interpreted to be procedural, in that the feminist argument could not be 
regarded as a fact and not sufficiently proved to allow the Tribunal to take official notice 
of it. In order to satisfy procedural fairness, the Tribunal must hear argument on the 
point before using it to declare a publication indecent67 • Thus Jeffries J did not reject in 
substance the feminist viewpoint as long as there was ample evidence to support its use 
in Tribunal proceedings to satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness 68 • In Re 
Penthouse (1990), the Tribunal was of the view that such evidence did exist, from both 
written and oral evidence presented to the Tribunal and from the Morris Report 69 , and 
moreover it was their duty under the Bill of Rights Act to do so 10• The Tribunal in 
formulating guideline 2, emphasised the fact that it was not using the representational 
argument that was criticised by Jeffries Jin Gordon & Gotch11 • However the inclusion 
of the words "or group of persons" in the guideline would seem to come very close to 
64 For a more in depth analysis and criticism of Jeffries J's argument see below Part VI C. 
65 See Re "Private Lives" Vol 1 Issues 2, 5 & 6(1990] NZAR 526; The Tribunal held that in fact the 
magazines could demean the individual portrayed, and perhaps a class or group, but that such an 
argument was not available to the Tribunal. 
66 Above n 15, 95. 
67 Above n 15, 95. 
66 See generally J Smillie "The Problems of 'Official Notice' : Reliance by Administrative Tribunals on 
the Personal Knowledge of their Members" [1975] Public Law 64. 
69 Morris The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Pornography(Justice Dept, 
Wellington, 1989). 
10 Under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990, freedom of expression may be limited to the extent that 
is justifiable in a free and democratic society. In Rv Butler (1991) DLR (4d) 449, a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada which summarises the Canadian case law on the Canadian Charter 
(substantially the same as the Bill of Rights Act 1990), held that under the Canadian equivalent of s5 of 
The Bill of Rights Act, limitation of freedom of expression was justifiable to "[criminalise] the proliferation 
of materials which undermine another basic Charter right." per Sopinka J, 476. 
71 Above n 5, 329. 
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the representational argument rejected by Jeffries J. Prima facie it would seem that any 
image which demeaned a group (ie women), must do so because it represents all 
women. Thus to include these words would be to include the representation argument.12 
B The Feminist Approach To Pornography73 
The fundamental tenet of the feminist argument is that74 : 
Pornography causes attitudes and behaviours of violence and discrimination which define 
the treatment and status of half the population . 
To demean women in pornography is a form of sex discrimination and is neither 
harmless fantasy nor a corrupt and confused misrepresentation of an otherwise natural 
and healthy sexuality75 • This view sees male and female sexuality as a social construct 
and that sexuality which includes male dominance as a fundan1ental aspect is harmful to 
women. Pornography is seen as institutionalising the sexuality of male supremacy76 by 
fusing the eroticisation of dominance and submission with the social construction of 
male and female. The causal element is satisfied by the argument that men treat women 
as who they see women as being, and in pornography, women are seen as being 
submissive and acted upon, that women desire dispossession and crnelty and are there 
to be violated and possessed 77 • The feminist perception of how pornography harms 
society is best summarised by the passage 18 : 
For an analysis and resolution of this problem, see below Part IV C. 
73 This paper will not examine the validity of the feminist argument in terms of whether it is sufficient 
to warrant the censorship of material which it aims to proscribe. It is clear from decisions of the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal and Waverly, that this argument has been accepted as being valid . A number of 
liberal writers in the United States have challenged the validity of the feminist argument. One major 
objection is the lack of empirical evidence that pornography in fact causes the harm on which the 
feminist argument is based. Another objection is that the logical consequence of the feminist 
argument is that a large amount of material which has no explicit sexual content, but demeans women 
would also be proscribed. This objection may not be persuasive. If material which is not explicit causes 
harm sufficient to warrant censorship, then this should be proscribed regardless of the nature of the 
material. See generally: I Jarvie "Pornography and/as Degradation" (1991) 14 International Journal of 
Law and Psychology 13; also see S Gey, Above n 40. 
74 CA MacKinnon "Not a Moral Issue" (1984) 2 Yale Law & Policy Rev 321, 323. 
75 Above n 74, 325 . 
76 Above n 74, 326. 
11 Above n 74, 326. 
78 Above n 74, 328. 
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Pornography participates in its audience' s eroticism because it creates an accessible sexual 
object, the possession and consumption of which is male sexuality, to be consumed and 
possessed as which is female sexuality. 
Thus to demean women is to construct for them a sexuality of powerlessness. This 
construction is seen to permeate all social interaction between men and women and is 
seen as harmful to women. 
The question of how pornography in itself causes this harm is explored in a 
manner which is a form of literary or artistic criticism, from the feminist perspective 79 • 
In order to do this, a picture is taken and then analysed not merely in terms of the literal 
images, but also in terms of the techniques of literary criticism (ie the literal images are 
interpreted), such as imagery, allusion, symbolism, metaphor and juxtaposition. In a 
passage in Pornography: Men Possessing Women, an analysis is made of a depiction in 
a magazine for the homosexual market in which a man is depicted masturbating to a 
Playboy centerfold, this serves as a graphic example of the process envisaged by 
feminist writers80: 
Without the presence of the female, masculinity cannot be realised, even among men who 
exclusively want each other; so the female is conjured up, not just to haunt or threaten, 
but to confirm the real superiority of the male in the mind of the reader .. . The feminine 
or references to the woman in male homosexual pornography clarify for the male that the 
significance of the penis cannot be compromised, no matter what words are used to 
describe his (temporary) position or stale of mind ... [S]uperiority means power and in 
male Lenns power is sexually exciting. In pornography, the homosexual male, like the 
heterosexual male, is encouraged Lo experience and enjoy his sexual superiority over 
women . 
The context of the image is explored in terms of how a given image portrays sexual 
power, how an image may or may not perpetuate female powerlessness and celebrate 
79 See generally A Dworkin Pornography: Men Possessing Women (Perigree Books, New York, 
1981 ); In this book, the author examines a number of "pornographic" texts and photographs, in terms 
of a feminist literary or artistic criticism, thus extracting the elements of the material which demeaned 
women. 
00 Above n 79, 44-45. 
• 
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male power. 
C The Resolution Of These Two Approaches In Guideline 2 
By adopting the feminist approach, the Tribunal avoids the representational 
argument criticised by Jeffries Jin Gordon & Gotch . In the representational argument, 
the models depicted symbolise all women, and therefore all women in the mind of the 
reader are equated with the demeaned position of the model, thus this is an argument 
based on harm to the reputation of all women, represented by the model. In the 
feminist view, the depiction causes or reinforces a construction of sexuality which 
discriminates against and is harmful as a cause of rape and abuse of women81 • Thus 
the harm perceived is not that to demean women is to harm their reputation, but that to 
demean women is to reinforce a sexuality which is discriminatory and harmful. Thus 
the model(s) do not represent all women, they are a hannful image of sexuality itself. 
However by affirming the feminist argument in guideline 2, the Tribunal has 
created great problems for organisations and individuals when dealing with material 
which is potentially subject to censorship under the Indecent Publications Act in terms 
of definitional certainty82: 
The wide range of argument from the importer, Customs and the Society indicates the 
extreme difficulty the Tribunal has had in attempting to translate the second guideline into 
a practical, applicable test which will generate certainty and predictability as well as 
ensuring that the public good is not injured. 
The ordinary meaning of the verb "to demean" is to "lower the dignity of'83 , this 
definition contains no element of the comparative relationship between male and female 
that is demanded by the feminist argument, the definition is close to the idea of 
damaged reputation which was expressly rejected by Jeffries J in Gordon & Gotch. 
This may be an element of the feminist argument, but does not encapsulate the whole 
81 Above n 43, 129-130. 
82 Above n 3, 6. 
83 The Concise Oxford Dictionary(8 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), 308. 
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argument. It is far removed from the concepts envisaged by feminist writers of a 
construction of a sexuality which discriminates against and is harmful to women, by 
reinforcing female powerlessness and celebrating male power over, and possession of, 
women. The Tribunal in its decisions has stated in simple terms the harm that the 
guideline is aimed at as being to prevent "the potential reinforcement of negative male 
attitudes to women" 84 , but this does not help in the definition of what the feminist view 
of demeaning means as opposed to the ordinary dictionary meaning, as it does not point 
out what those negative male attitudes are. It is clear from their decisions that the 
Tribunal is using a feminist gloss of the word "demean", but this is not clear at all in the 
guideline. 
The phrase "treats as inherently inferior or unequal" also fails to convey 
adequately the feminist perspective that the guideline is primarily addressing for similar 
reasons. There is no mention of a comparison to any person with whom the person in 
the depiction must be inferior. Even if being inferior to someone is implicit in guideline 
2, the person must necessarily be a symbol for the person or group who is/are treated 
as inherently inferior. This phrase comes close to the word "denigrate" which was 
criticised by Jeffries Jin Gordon & Gotch, as symbolising a reduced reputation in all 
women. Thus the feminist perspective again is not reflected in the guideline. 
The second and more serious problem with the guideline, which the judgement 
of Eichelbaum CJ graphically exhibited in his judgment in Sodety for the Promotion 
of Community Standards v Waverly, is the difficulty that a lay person will have in 
interpreting a picture or text in order to detem1ine whether any given publication in fact 
does demean women. The guideline as it stands under the majority approach in 
Waverly means that ultimately before a publication is held indecent, it must demean 
women regardless of whether the publication contains elements listed in the brackets. 
The Tribunal is made up of five members two of whom must have special qualifications 
in the field of literature or education85 , and thus the expertise exists on the Tribunal to 
Above n 3, 7; Above n I. 
85 As required by s 3 of the Indecent Publications Act 1963. 
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assess publications in terms of the literary analysis envisaged by feminist writers. The 
lay person may not have such skills. It is arguable that a piece of literature conveys the 
meaning intended by the author to the reader, regardless of their ability to engage in 
literary criticism, and the skill of literary criticism is merely the ability to articulate how 
the author achieved his or her intended effect. Thus the lay person will intuitively 
know whether a publication has the dominant effect of demeaning women. Is this 
sufficiently certain to include in a legal test which has as its aim to promote both 
predictability and certainty, and to prevent injury to the public good? Such an argument 
is reminiscent of the words of Justice Stewart when talking of obscenity law in The 
U.S.A.: "I know it when I see it" 86• An analysis based on intuition is not consistent 
with the goals of freedom of expression and its strict limitation by the legislature. 
Alternatively, to go to the other extreme that was manifested by the judgment of 
Eichelbaum CJ in Waverly, whereby an effect is deemed by reference to easily 
ascertained listings of conduct, regardless of the effect and context that they in fact 
have, is to go too far in the other direction. To disregard the effect is to disregard the 
harm to which the guideline is aimed at preventing. When these two weaknesses are 
combined, the guideline comes up wholly wanting in terms of definitional certainty. 
There is no actual reference to what is actually meant by the words " to demean" and the 
assistance given to determine whether something is demeaning to women is wholly 
inadequate, if the existence of such elements is necessarily qualified by the need for a 
publication to have the dominant effect of demeaning women. 
VII AN ALTERNATIVE? 
An alternative to Guideline 2 should address the fundamental problems of that 
guideline. The first of these problems is that the guideline through the use of the words 
"demean" and "u·eat as inherently inferior" alone in the guideline do not give any guide 
as to the effect to which the guideline is in fact addressed. The second problem is that 
the guideline does not adequately show how the connection between depiction and 
86 Jacobellis v Ohio (1964) 378 US 184, 197. 
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effect is to be assessed. First an alternative guideline should include reference to the 
feminist gloss of what is meant by "demeaning" in the preamble to the guideline in 
order to make clear the effect that the guideline is attempting to prevent. A suggested 
form may be: 
Material which constructs in tbe eyes of readers a sexuality for women which eroticises 
dominance by men and tbe submission of women, in which women are acted upon by 
men, is harmful, as it defmes tbe treatment and status of women. Material having such 
an effect, which is not a serious treatment is injurious to tbe public good. 
Secondly, the guideline should emphasise that in determining whether a 
publication demeans women, context is a vital element in such a determination to reflect 
the approach of feminist writers to actual pornographic material and that determination 
requires a connection to be made between the abstract concept of demean and the 
concrete image on the printed page. This poses serious problems for any tribunal 
issuing guidelines. The link required by the feminist approach to pornography is in the 
nature of a literary or artistic criticism type analysis87• This type of analysis is a skill 
often learnt at a university level of education, which not every person who may have to 
deal with such material and therefore come under the purview of the Act, will 
necessarily have. 
This problem may be mitigated by the inclusion in the guideline of a more 
comprehensive list of elements which will help in determining whether a publication 
demeans women. This third element might be served by the use of such a list of 
elements which w~re used in a city ordinance on civil rights in Minneapolis in order to 
give a more comprehensive list of examples for a lay person to focus on88 : 
Pornography is tbe graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures 
or words, tliat also includes one or more of tbe following : 
(i) Women are presented dehumanised as sexual objects, things or conunodities; or 
Above part VI C. 
88 This ordinance was passed by the Minneapolis city council in 1983, but was ultimately vetoed by 
the mayor in 1984. See generally P Brest "Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-
Pornography Movement in Minneapolis" (1987) 36 Stanford Law Review 607. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLING! ul'i 
t 
24 
(ii) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(iii) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being 
raped; or 
(iv) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or muWated or bruised or 
physically hurt; or 
(v) Women are presented in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or 
(vi) Women's body parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts and buttocks - are 
exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or 
(vii) Women are presented as whores by nature; or 
(viii) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(ix) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or 
inferior, bleeding or bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual . 
This formulation unfortunately involves a number of elements which require subjective 
assessment89 • However these elements may be severable in order to give a list of 
objective elements by which an assessment could be made by an expanded category of 
elements from that of Guideline 2. In combination with a clearer indication of what the 
harmful effect intended to be proscribed, this will greatly improve the ability of those 
involved with material that may be subject to the Act to predict whether it may be 
censored. 
VIII THE FILMS, VIDEOS, AND PUBLICATIONS CLASSIFICATION 
BILL 1993; DOES IT IMPROVE THE SITUATION? 
In 1989, the government came under increasing pressure to reform New 
Zealand censorship law and as a result appointed a ministerial committee of inquiry to 
examine both public opinion on issues of pornography, and the ability of the current 
system to meet the needs of the public. The result was The Morris Report which 
These include elements such as "postures of sexual submission", "presented as whores by 
nature" and "shown as filthy" which will require elements of a deconstructionist analysis to make the link 
between the conceptual and the concrete. 
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recommended a comprehensive overhaul90 of the current legislation on censorship in 
New Zealand. This resulted in the introduction of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Bill. This paper will focus solely upon the definition of "objectionable" 
in cl 3 of the Bill9 '. Because the Bill was introduced in order to improve the current law 
on censorship, this paper will examine the Bills approach to matter which demeans 
women, and whether the Bill has improved the definitional certainty of guideline 2 
under the Indecent Publications Act. 
A The Greater Need For Certainty. 
Clause 121 of the new Bill creates even greater need for the legislature and the 
new classification authority to have regard to definitional certainty. This provision 
makes it an offence to simply be in possession of "objectionable" material as defined in 
cl 3 of the Bill, regardless of whether the material has been classified as such 92• Thus 
under such a provision, the ability of the ordinary person to identify "objectionable" 
material is of even greater importance. 
B The Definition Under Cl 3. 
Under cl 3 of the Bill, the ultimate standard as to whether something will be 
banned is whether it is objectionable under the definition given to that word in the Bill. 
Under cl 3(1), a publication is objectionable if it "describes.depicts, expresses or 
otherwise deals with matters of sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a 
manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public 
good". This fommlation is manifestly similar to the test of indecency in the Indecent 
The major changes are: (1) One censorship standard for all publications, films and videos; (2) 
Establishment of new bodies: A classification office, aboard of review and an expanded industry 
labelling body; (3) Standard of "objectionability'' which will prohibit material, the availability of which "is 
likely to be injurious to the public good"; (4) Certain extreme publications will be deemed to be "likely to 
be injurious to the public good"; (5) Existing criminal offenses to be rationalised and a new offense of 
possession to be added. 
91 This section is reproduced in full in Appendix A. 
92 Clause 26 of the Bill enables the court to refer any material for classification to the Authority in a 
criminal trial. 
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Publications Act93 , apart from the use of the idea of likelihood, and the element of 
availability94• The inclusion of these words may only be there to loosen up the 
requirements for proof of causation between the publication and injury to the public 
good95 • Under cl 3(2), publications are deemed to be objectionable if they include 
depictions which promote or support exploitation of children, combining sex and 
violence, necrophilia, urolagnia, coprophilia, bestiality and acts of torture and extreme 
violence. Under cl 3(3), a number of elements are listed for the classification body to 
take into account when determining whether a publication is likely to be injurious to the 
public good under cl 3(1): 
(a) Describes, depicts or otherwise deals with -
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical harm, or acts of significant 
cruelty; 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence or coercion in association with 
sexual conduct; 
(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or demeaning 
nature; 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is derived from inflicting or 
suffering cruelty or pain; 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person; 
93 Section 2 of the Indecent Publications Act. 
94 The inclusion of the concept of availability may lead to problems. It may have been included to 
cover situations where a "one off' publication is submitted as a result of a charge under part VI II of the 
Bill. In this situation the publication is no longer available to anyone and therefore cannot injure the 
public good (Under cl 3(4)(d), the classification authority must take into account to whom the 
publication is intended or likely to be made available. If a publication is seized, it is not intended nor is it 
likely to be made available to anyone). In this situation, the classification authority would have to 
assume for the purpose of the charge that the publication were available to some person in order to 
determine whether it was injurious to the public good in the circumstances in which it was seized. 
Otherwise it would seem to be redundant, as availability is taken into account in cl 3(4)(d). 
95 This point was discussed in Everard, Above n 47, 56; It was held that the interpretation of s 2 of 
the Indecent Publications Act was useful in interpreting s 13 of the Films Act 1983 which used the 
phrase "likely to be injurious to the public good". Also in Wheeler v EverardUnreported, 22 Nov 1986, 
High Court Wellington Registry, CP 284/86, Heron J held that the same principles were applicable 
between the two statutes despite the difference in wording. 
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(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular class 
of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of the .. . 
sex ... of the members of Uiat class. 
The first question to be answered is whether the new statutory definition actually 
would allow the new classification body to declare a publication indecent on the basis 
that it demeaned women in terms of the feminist argument. The test in cl 3(1) that 
something must be "likely to be injurious to the public good" is manifestly similar to the 
test under the Indecent Publications Act. Thus it would seem prima facie, that what 
was injurious to the public good before the introduction of the Bill will still be injurious 
to the public good notwithstanding the introduction of this Bill. The ultimate criteria in 
each piece of legislation is/was that a publication be injurious and now the availability 
be likely to be injurious to the public good. The substance of what injures the public 
good should not change simply because the legislation has changed, thus the feminist 
argument remains valid under cl 3(1) of the Bill 96 • However does the inclusion of the 
word "demean" in cl 3(3), imply that only weight should be given to the fact that a 
publication may demean (in the dictionary sense of the word) women, and that a 
publication which does demean women (in the feminist sense) will not necessarily be 
injurious to the public good under cl 3(1)? It is arguable that the inclusion of the word 
demean is not a direct reference to the feminist argument, but is descriptive of the 
elements of that argument and should be read in its ordinary sense. Thus the feminist 
argument is still part of the "injurious to the public good" test, and that the word 
"demean" is used. not in the sense used in Guideline 2 (ie as an encapsulation of that 
argument), but in its ordinary sense, as a concept useful in identifying elements of that 
approach in the relevant material97 • Thus the feminist argument survives the old 
legislation. Does the inclusion of the extended criteria under cl 3(3) improve upon the 
definitional certainty in guideline ? 
This provision must also be interpreted in light of s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. For a full 
exposition of this argument see above Part IV B. 
97 Above part VI C. 
fl 
fl 
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The extended list of criteria in cl 3(3) are a marked improvement on the Indecent 
Publications Act, but in terms of the feminist critique of pornographic material which 
has become one of the big focuses of the censorship debate in recent years98 , the new 
statute is little improvement on Guideline 2. It contains a number of elements which 
may be useful in determining whether a publication will have the effect objected to in 
the feminist argument. Clauses 3(3)(a)(i), 3(3)(a)(ii) and 3(3)(a)(v) are helpful in 
directing what should be looked for in a publication, but they fail to include the element 
of objectification which is one of the main focuses of the feminist argument. The focus 
of these clauses on the more violent aspects of pornography may direct attention away 
from material which is not violent, but which the feminist writers see as equally 
harmful. Clauses 3(3)(a)(iii), 3(3)(c) and 3(3)(e) may be directed at this aspect of the 
feminist critique, but the use of words such as "degrades", "dehumanises" and 
"demeans" means that this provision suffers from the same problems as Guideline 299 • 
The new statute goes some way to improving the definitional certainty of what 
"demeaning to women" in terms of the feminist approach, means under the test of 
"likely to be injurious to the public good", but it does not cover the whole picture. It 
does not outline the harm to which the feminist argument is aimed and does not explain 
the critical analysis to be undertaken in order to make the link between the conceptual 
and the concrete 100• It is submitted that under the new legislation, the new classification 
authority should issue guidelines similar to that proposed in Part VII of this paper. This 
could be achieved through the Information Unit established under cl 81(1) of the Bill. 
Under cl 81(2)(b)(ii), the Unit must disseminate to the public information about the 
procedures for the.classification of publications. This may include guidelines issued by 
the Classification Office. The use of the feminist argument in light of the progress 
made by women in recent decades is a growing phenomenon in censorship tribunals 
and litigation. If this argument is to continue and grow under the new test, then the 
difficulties in making the necessary connections with that which is depicted upon the 
98 See generally The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Enquiry into Pornography, Above n 69 . 
99 Above part VI C. 
100 Economy of words may be cited as a reason for these omissions, as ~ would be a very clumsy 
statute that included the harm that the test of "injurious to the public good" is aimed at. 
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page and the harm caused by such depictions may be eased. The new authority should 
make it clear how it will approach such an issue, given the greater need for such action 
under cl 121 of the new statute. 
IX CONCLUSION 
Waverly is a case in which a number of issues facing the law of censorship have 
highlighted the need in New Zealand to address some of the more basic problems in 
this area. The need for the legislature to make clear what is tolerated in terms of free 
speech and what will be proscribed are paramount. In a democratic society, the need 
for its citizens to have a clear idea of what is, or will be, proscribed should be a driving 
force in such legislation. The introduction of the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classifications Bill will mean a major change in the way censorship law in New 
Zealand is administered. Under this new administration, the new classification 
authority should attempt to address some of the problems of definition, which were so 
acutely raised in Waverly. The Bill falls short of the mark in its attempts to resolve 
such issues. In a Bill which has the potential of impinging on peoples' civil liberties to 
the extent of the possession offence in cl 121, there must be sufficient certainty for 
people to avoid these draconian consequences. The increase in the use of the feminist 
approach to pornography as a justification for censorship has made this problem even 
more acute. The use of this argument is likely to increase with the great strides made in 
feminist scholarship, such as feminist legal theory and feminist philosophy. This paper 
has suggested a way in which these problems may be mitigated by the use of more 
effective guidelines and effective public dissemination of those guidelines. The only 
other alternative is that the public submit every piece of material which they suspect 
may be "Objectionable" to the classification authority. However the level of the fee for 
such submissions (Under cl 15(2) of the Bill) and lack of resources may make this 
impractical. The new Bill has meant an improvement in the administration of 
censorship in New Zealand, but the fundamental issues raised in this paper must be 
addressed before it is to become a credible piece of censorship legislation. 
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APPENDIX A 
8. Meaning of "objectionable"-(!) For the purposes of 
this Act, a publication is objectionable it it describes, depicts, 5 
expresses, or otherwise deals with matters (o.J) such as sex, 
horror rime, cruelty. or viole~h a manner that the 
availabili f the publication~ be injurious to the 
pu C good. 
(2) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the 
purposes of this Act if the publication promotes or supports, or 
tends to promote or support,-
(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, 
for sexual purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to 
participate in. or submit to, sexual conduct: or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person: 
or 
10 
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(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with 
degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual 20 
conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(I) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or 
extreme cruelty. 
(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or 25 
not any publication (other than a publication to which subsection 
121 of this section a pp lies) is objectionable or should be given a 
classification other than objectionable, particular weight shall 
be given to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in 
which, the publication-
(a) Describes, depicts. or otherwise deals with-
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical 
harm, or acts of significant cruelty: 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence 
or coercion in association with sexual conduct: 
(iii) Other sexual or physi et of a 
degrading or dehumanising demeanin ture: 
(iv) Sexual conduct with o ren, or young 
30 
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persons, or both: 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is 40 
derived from inflicting or suffering cruelty or pain: 
(b) Exploits the nudity of c~~ersons. or both: 
(c) Degrades 01 dehumani~ y person: 
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or _acts _of t_errorism: 
(e) Represents (whether directly or by 1mphcat1on)_ that 
members of any particular class of the public_ are 
inherently inferior to other members of the public_ by 
reason of the colour. race, ethnic or national ongms. 
sex, physical or inteUectual capacity, or religious 
beliefs of the members of that class. 
(4) In determining. for the purpose~ of this Act,_ whether _or 
not any publication (other than a p_ublicat1on to wluch subsection 
(21 of this section applies) is objectionable or should be given a 
classification other than objectionable, the foUowmg matters 
shall also be considered: 
(a) The dominant effect of t_he publicat_ion as a whole: . . 
(q) The impact of the medium m wh,ch the publicauon 1s 
presented: . . 
(c) The character of the publication, includ':1g _any ment, 
value. or importance that the publicauon has m 
relation to literary, artistic, social, cultural. 
educational. scientific. or other maners: 
(d) The persons, classes of persons, or ag;e _groups of th_e 
persons to whom the pubhcauon 1s mtended or IS 
likdy to be made available: . . . . 
(e) The purpose for which the publicauon 1s intended to be 
used: 
(D Any other relevant circumstances relating to the im<"nded 
or likely use of the publicauon. 
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